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Behavioral information security has become an important aspect of information security. In this study, we 
extend previous works on developing a comprehensive tool to measure security behaviors (i.e. Security 
Behavior Intentions scale – SeBIS (Egelman and Peer, 2015)). We extend the work on SeBIS by 1) 
proposing the use of security domain-specific risk as opposed to a generic risk measure, 2) investigating 
differences in SeBIS across age, gender, education and experience, and 3) providing suggestions for 
improving SeBIS measures. Survey results from our study provide support for security risk - device 
securement relationship, a previously unsupported link. We also uncover the role of demographics in 
influencing SeBIS. Overall, our study contributes to, and further establishes SeBIS as a predictive tool for 
measuring security behaviors.  
Keywords 
Security Behaviors, SeBIS, Risk, Individual Differences, Awareness  
INTRODUCTION 
In recent times, considerable emphasis is placed on the ‘human element’ in information security. End-users 
are argued to be the weakest link in security chain (Mitnick, 2003; Yan et al., 2018), enablers of cyberattacks 
(OTA, 2018), and most of them don’t follow security best practices (Pew Research Center, 2017). 
Accordingly, research has studied various behavioral aspects of information security. These include: 
compliance behaviors (Aurigemma and Mattson, 2017; Siponen and Vance, 2010), secure email behavior 
(Ng, Kankanhalli, and Xu, 2009), omissive behaviors (Workman, Bommer, and Straub, 2008), and 
protective behaviors (Chen and Li, 2017; Liang and Xue, 2010). In accordance with their research emphasis, 
most of these behavioral studies focus on a particular behavior – e.g. email behavior (Ng et al., 2009) or 
antispyware usage behavior (Liang and Xue, 2010).  
As is evident from above studies, security behaviors are wide-ranging. Rather than focus on one particular 
security behavior, some researchers study how to capture security behaviors that span wide-range of 
information security behaviors. Here, researchers are interested in developing a security behavior scale that 
has broader application rather than to a specific purpose. Previous attempts to capture wide-ranging security 
behaviors included developing a taxonomy of security behaviors (Stanton, Stam, Mastrangelo, and Jolton, 
2005), and developing measures for security scales.  
We could identify two recently developed ‘holistic’ security behavior scales in the literature. Human 
Aspects of Information Security – Questionnaire (HAIS-Q) (Parsons, McCormac, Butavicius, Pattinson, 
and Jerram, 2014) and Security Behavior Intentions Scale (SeBIS) (Egelman and Peer, 2015). HAIS-Q is 
an awareness scale and includes behaviors. It uses a knowledge-attitude-behavior model to develop the 
scale. In other words, HAIS-Q measures knowledge, attitude and behavior. On the other hand, SeBIS scale 
specifically focuses on behaviors and is much more parsimonious. Since they both measure security 
behavior, there is conceptual overlap between HAIS-Q and SeBIS scales. For example, some of the 
dimensions they measure include internet usage and passwords behaviors. HAIS-Q scale is validated in 
various studies and exhibits good properties (McCormac et al., 2017; Parsons et al., 2017; Parsons et al., 
2014), whereas SeBIS scale has marginal properties and previous studies that used SeBIS found issues with 
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reliabilities. Previous research has called for further testing of SeBIS scale (Egelman and Peer, 2015; 
Gratian, Bandi, Cukier, Dykstra, and Ginther, 2018). To advance security research, validated measures of 
security behavior intentions are needed (Thompson, McGill, and Wang, 2017).  
Therefore, in this research we provide a further test for SeBIS scale. Previous studies of SeBIS scale also 
included the impact of demographics and risk on security behaviors. In this study, we argue and provide 
support for a security domain-specific risk awareness scale. In addition, we test the impact of demographic 
variables on SeBIS scales.  
In summary, we make the following contributions:  
- We further validate the SeBIS scale and propose modifications to SeBIS scale 
- We argue for, and provide support for the use of security domain-specific risk scale in studying 
security behaviors 
- Impact of demographic variables such as age, gender, education and experience  is established  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, we provide literature review on behavioral security 
studies (including previous SeBIS studies) and propose our hypotheses. Next, we discuss the research 
methodology used and present the results. Finally, we conclude by discussing the results and implications 
from our study. 
BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES 
Behavioral Intentions in IS and Information Security Literature 
One of the mature streams of IS research is the adoption and use of IT (Tamilmani, Rana, and Dwivedi, 
2020; Venkatesh, Morris, Davis, and Davis, 2003). Since implementation of new technology is costly and 
potentially disastrous, a major stream of research focused on adoption and use of IT (Venkatesh et al., 
2003). Individuals have to utilize the technology or it will be a wasted investment for organizations (Berns, 
2017). Researchers have used various theories to explain individual adoption and use of IT. Some of the 
widely used theories are Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA), Technology Acceptance Model (TAM), 
Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) and Unified Theory of Acceptance and Use of Technology (UTAUT) 
(Tamilmani et al., 2020; Venkatesh et al., 2003). A recurring theme in these models is the use of behavioral 
intentions of use as a surrogate for actual use.  
Over the decades, the IS research has used behavioral intentions as a variable of interest in various contexts 
such as online healthcare, cloud computing, mobile banking etc. (Luarn and Lin, 2005; Shiau and Chau, 
2016; Swar, Hameed, and Reychav, 2017). The study of behavioral intentions has carried over to the 
information security research also (Cram, D'arcy, and Proudfoot, 2019; Trang and Brendel, 2019). 
Behavioral intentions in security research can be broadly classified into pro-security or anti-security 
behaviors (Jaeger, 2018). Pro-security behaviors reflect intentions that are supportive of information 
security. These can be in terms of complying with security policies, using security tools and technologies 
(Chen and Li, 2017; Liang and Xue, 2010). Anti-security behaviors reflect intentions that are disruptive of 
information security. These can be in terms of violating security policies, not following security 
requirements and, intentions towards unethical IT use (Chatterjee, Sarker, and Valacich, 2015). As 
indicated in the Introduction section, we further study the security intentions at a holistic level by extending 
the SeBIS scale.  
SeBIS Related Literature 
To develop a predictive tool that could be used to measure security behaviors, Egelman and Peer (2015) 
developed the SeBIS scale. The scale is derived based on best practices prescribed by the United States 
Computer Readiness and Security Team (US-CERT), internet service providers, industry experts, among 
others. After extensive testing, four dimensions of security behaviors are proposed. These are device 
securement, password generation, proactive awareness and updating. Device Securement focuses on 
security behaviors such as use of PIN on phones used to protect access. Password Generation focuses on 
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good password behaviors such as using strong passwords and not reusing passwords. Proactive Awareness 
focuses on users’ security awareness such as identifying valid web links. Finally, Updating focuses on 
users’ behavior with applying software patches. Further description of these four factors is presented in 
Table 1. 
 
Dimensions of SeBIS scale Description 
Device Securement This dimension refers to users’ behaviors in logically securing their 
devices. Themes covered in this area involve screen locks using 
PIN/Passwords, locking devices when stepping away from devices, 
among others.   
Password Generation This dimension refers to users’ behaviors concerning password hygiene. 
Themes covered in this area involve using strong passwords, not reusing 
passwords, among others. 
Proactive Awareness This dimension focuses on users’ awareness in reading contextual cues. 
Themes covered in this area involve whether users notice web links, 
among others. 
Updating This dimension focuses on users’ behaviors with patching 
vulnerabilities. Themes covered in this area involve whether users update 
programs when prompted, among others.  
Table 1: SeBIS scale dimensions 
 
SeBIS research is still in the nascent stage and mixed results are reported from the use of SeBIS in 
Behavioral Information Security research. Table 2 summarizes previous SeBIS studies and their key 
findings in the context of this study. A recurring theme in these studies tested the relationship between risk-
taking perceptions and SeBIS scale dimensions. In these studies, Domain-Specific Risk-Taking 
(DOSPERT) scale is used to measure risk-taking propensity (Egelman and Peer, 2015; Gratian et al., 2018). 
The DOSPERT scale consists a total of 30 items in different risk domains such as health/safety, recreational, 
financial, ethical and social (Blais and Weber, 2006). The premise for developing DOSPERT scale is that 
risk taking in one domain doesn’t translate to other domains (Blais and Weber, 2006; Szrek, Chao, 
Ramlagan, and Peltzer, 2012). For example, high recreational risk takers do not exhibit the same risk-taking 
propensity in financial domain (Hanoch, Johnson, and Wilke, 2006).  
Mixed results are reported with dimensions of risk in SeBIS studies. For example, social risk-taking 
perceptions are significantly related to password generation security behaviors in Egelman and Peer (2015), 
however they are unrelated in Gratian et al. (2018). Because of the newness of SeBIS scale and mixed 
findings, further testing of SeBIS scale is suggested. Our study addresses this call and contributes in the 
establishment of a holistic security behavior scale 
 
Study Key Findings related to SeBIS Potential issues/ suggestions for 
future work 
Egelman and Peer (2015) Developed a parsimonious SeBIS 
scale consisting of four factors 
Reliabilities range in 0.6-0.7 
Mixed correlations with risk scale 
Further testing of SeBIS scales is 
needed 
Egelman, Harbach, and Peer (2016) SeBIS scale is a good predictor for 
actual security behaviors 
Potential of SeBIS as a predictive 
tool, further testing needed  
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Reliabilities for SeBIS factors range 
in 0.6-0.7 
Gratian et al. (2018) Validates and extends Egelman and 
Peer (2015)’s study.  
Individual differences exist in 
security behavior intentions 
Weaker reliabilities for SeBIS scale 
reported (0.6 to 0.75) 
Relation between risk and security 
behaviors are mixed  
Further testing of SeBIS scale is 
suggested 
Wash, Rader, and Fennell (2017) SeBIS scale is not used in its 
entirety  
- 
Tischer et al. (2016) Users do plug-in USB drives they 
find 
SeBIS scale reliabilities are much 
lower, ranging from 0.4-0.7 
Table 2: Summary of previous SeBIS studies 
 
Further, although DOSPERT covers different domains, information security risk does not fit in any of the 
DOSPERT domains (i.e. health/safety, recreational, financial, ethical and social). Some of the items used 
in these domains are “Going camping in the wilderness (Recreational)”, “Passing off somebody else’s work 
as your own (Ethical)”, “Sunbathing without sunscreen (health/safety)” (Blais and Weber, 2006). We 
believe these items and domains do not capture the Information Security risks.  Therefore, we propose and 
use a security risk scale that is more specific to information security.  
In behavioral information security research, risk perceptions are measured in at least couple of different, 
but related ways. One method is to measure risk by measuring the components that create risk. Since risk 
is described as a combination of severity of a threat and the susceptibility of a resource, risk perceptions 
are measured as two constructs - severity and susceptibility (Johnston and Warkentin, 2010; Liang and Xue, 
2010). A more parsimonious way of measuring risk perception is to directly measure risk using a single 
construct (Guo, Yuan, Archer, and Connelly, 2011). (Guo et al., 2011)’s risk perception scale consists of 
only three items. A sample item for our context is “Not having a passcode on my devices can put important 
data at risk”. The risk perceptions measured by Guo et al. (2011) performed as well as other risk scales that 
used two measures (i.e. severity and susceptibility) (Vance, Brinton Anderson, Brock Kirwan, and Eargle, 
2014). Further, Guo et al. (2011)’s risk perceptions measures are well established and also used in various 
contexts (Haag and Eckhardt, 2014). Therefore, use security risk scale adapted from Guo et al. (2011). The 
scale measures users’ perception of risk associated with a particular security behavior. We believe this is 
an appropriate security risk measure because SeBIS measures security behavior intentions.  
Hypotheses 
Risk: Understanding how users perceive risks enables us to understand users’ behaviors. For example, 
Health Belief Model argued that if individuals perceive a behavior as risky, they would choose a behavior 
that is less risky (Becker, 1974). Accordingly, previous security research has tested the link between risk 
perceptions and behavioral intentions (Liang and Xue, 2010; Ng et al., 2009; Workman et al., 2008). 
Previous research on SeBIS has also tested the relationship between risk perceptions and security behaviors 
(Egelman and Peer, 2015; Gratian et al., 2018). Therefore, we hypothesize  
H1: Individuals’ risk perceptions will be significantly related to their security behavior intentions. 
Specifically,  
H1a-d: Individuals’ (device securement, password generation, proactive awareness, and updating) risk 
perceptions will be significantly related to their (device securement, password generation, proactive 
awareness, and updating) intentions. 
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Demographic variables: Gender studies have shown that women and men differ in their risk-taking 
propensities. Women are inclined to take fewer risks in various domains (Harris, Jenkins, and Glaser, 2006). 
In shopping context, women perceive higher risk while shopping online (Garbarino and Strahilevitz, 2004). 
Also, risk taking behaviors are shown to vary by age (Rolison, Hanoch, Wood, and Liu, 2014).Further, 
inexperienced people are known to take more risks (Menkhoff, Schmidt, and Brozynski, 2006). Previously, 
age, gender and education are proposed to influence security behavior intentions (Herath and Rao, 2009). 
Demographic variables such as age, gender are known to influence strength of security behaviors 
(McCormac et al., 2017; Sheng, Holbrook, Kumaraguru, Cranor, and Downs, 2010). Therefore, we 
hypothesize 
H2: Individuals’ (device securement, password generation, proactive awareness, and updating) intentions 
will vary across gender, education, experience and age. 
METHODOLOGY 
Similar to previous SeBIS studies, we have used a survey methodology. As explained previously, one key 
difference in our study is the use of risk scale. The items used in this study are presented in Table 3.  
 
Concept Measured and Related Items1 
SeBIS -Updating • When I'm prompted about a software update, I install it right 
away. (Updating) 
• I try to make sure that the programs I use are up-to-date. (Updating) 
• I verify that my anti-virus software has been regularly updating 
itself. (Updating) 
SeBIS – Device 
Securement 
• I manually lock my computer screen when I step away from it. (Device 
Securement) 
• I set my computer screen to automatically lock if I don't use it for a 
prolonged period of time. (Device Securement) 
• I use a PIN or passcode to unlock my mobile phone. (Device Securement) 





• I submit information to websites without first verifying that it will be sent 
securely (e.g., SSL, “https://”, a lock icon). (Proactive Awareness)  
• If I discover a security problem, I continue what I was doing because I 
assume someone else will fix it. (Proactive Awareness) 
• When someone sends me a link, I open it without first verifying where it 
goes. (Proactive Awareness) 
• When browsing websites, I mouse over links to see where they go, before 
clicking them. (Proactive Awareness) 
• I know what website I'm visiting based on its look and feel, rather than by 




• I do not change my passwords, unless I have to. (Password Generation) 
• I use different passwords for different accounts that I have. (Password 
Generation) 
• I do not include special characters in my password if it's not 
required. (Password Generation) 
 
1 SeBIS Items from Egelman and Peer (2015), 5-point Likert scale (Never to Always). Risk Items from 
(Guo et al., 2011), 5-point Likert scale (Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree) 
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• When I create a new online account, I try to use a password that goes 
beyond the site's minimum requirements. (Password Generation) 
Risk The anchor question is changed to measure risk perceptions for different SeBIS 
domains (i.e. ‘Reusing the same password’ for Password Generation or ‘Not updating 
software’ for Updating or ‘Not checking the URL bar for the lock icon or “https://”:’ 
for Proactive Awareness) 
Risk measure for Device Securement  
Not having a passcode on my devices: 
• Can cause damages to computer security. 
• Can put important data at risk. 
• Will most likely cause security breaches. 
Table 3: Concepts Measured and Related Items  
 
A web survey with items for SeBIS, risk scales, and demographic variables was created using Qualtrics. A 
link for the survey was sent to the University’s research recruitment email service. This service is provided 
by the authors’ university. In essence, a sample of university students is recruited to participate in research 
studies. The link to our survey was sent to a random sample from this group. The participation in the study 
was optional and no incentive was given to participate in this study (monetary or extra-credit for courses). 
A total of 209 responses were received. After dropping responses with incomplete data, 163 data points 
remained.  
RESULTS 
We have used SPSS® for statistical analysis. Table 4 shows the descriptive statistics of the respondents. 
The sample was almost equally split on gender (53.4% female). Since our study was conducted at a large 
university, majority of respondents were young, undergraduate students. Further, computer/Internet 
experience was captured using a qualitative self-rating and 41.7% of the respondents consider themselves 
to be in the advanced and expert category.  
 
Demographics 
Gender 53.4% Female 
Age 18-24 Years – 53.4% 
25-34 years – 23.3% 
>35 years – 23.3% 
Education Undergraduate – 70.6% 
Graduate – 29.4% 
Experience Advanced/Expert – 41.7% 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics 
 
Before testing the hypotheses, we tested the validity of SeBIS and Risk measures. We used the same 16-
item SeBIS scale as is used in the previous research (Egelman and Peer, 2015; Gratian et al., 2018). Our 
initial factor analysis of 16-item SeBIS scale yielded a five-factor model as shown in Table A1, Appendix 
A. This is different from the original four-factor solution.  
A close inspection of 5-factor solution suggested two potential problems. The device securement item ‘I 
use a PIN or passcode to unlock my mobile phone’ (SeBIS5ssSEC) loaded highly on Factor 5. Since the 
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conceptualization of SeBIS scale (in 2014), the biometric approach for authentication has grown rapidly 
(Biometrics-today, 2017). For example, first major phone with biometrics was released in 2013 (Agomuoh, 
2017) and it is expected that by 2020, 100% of smartphones will have biometric capabilities (Biometrics-
today, 2016). Given this growth, it is not surprising that users are more comfortable using biometric 
technologies for authentication (IBM, 2018). Therefore, we argue that the context for Device Securement 
item ‘I use a PIN or passcode to unlock my mobile phone’ is outdated. Methodologically, this item did not 
load with other Device Securement items either (as shown in Table A1, Appendix A). Accordingly, we 
have dropped this item from further analysis.  
Further, a construct scale’s dimensionality can be impacted if the scale consists of reverse-coded items 
(Herche and Engelland, 1996). Out of five ‘proactive awareness’ scale items, the item ‘When browsing 
websites, I mouse over links to see where they go, before clicking them’ is reverse-coded compared to other 
‘proactive awareness’ items (as listed in Table 3). Therefore, this item is dropped from further analysis. 
Even after dropping these two items, each of the SeBIS dimensions have at least three items (Raubenheimer, 
2004). Subsequent factor analysis yielded a four-factor solution for SeBIS items as shown in Table A2 in 
Appendix A.  
Next, we used Cronbach’s alpha (α) to measure reliability of the scales. The results indicated that SeBIS 
and risk scales exhibited moderate to very good reliabilities (Hinton, McMurray, and Brownlow, 2004). 
Specifically, α(SeBIS-updating) is 0.75, α(SeBIS-device securement) is 0.65, α(SeBIS-proactive 
awareness) is 0.63, α(SeBIS-password generation) is 0.67 and α(risk) ranged from 0.85 to 0.94. The above 
reliabilities for SeBIS scales are generally better than previously reported (Gratian et al., 2018; Tischer et 
al., 2016).  
 
 Securement Passwords Awareness Updating 
Risk 0.24** 0.32** 0.25** 0.39** 
Table 5: Standardized regression coefficients. **p<0.01 
 
Table 5 shows the regression coefficients on factor scores of risk and SeBIS dimensions. Hypothesis H1 
proposed that individuals’ risk perceptions would be significantly related to their security behavior 
intentions. The standardized coefficients ranged from 0.24 to 0.39, with the strongest relationship for SeBIS 
(updating) dimension.  These results support H1a-d. 
 
 Securement Passwords Awareness Updating 
Age  1.61+ 2.32*  
Gender  1.90*  3.11** 
Education   1.38+  
Experience   1.74* 2.45** 
Table 6: t-test for mean differences for SeBIS dimensions. **p<0.01; *p<0.05, +p<0.1 
 
Hypothesis H2 proposed that SeBIS dimensions would vary across gender, education, experience and age. 
Table 6 shows the mean differences for SeBIS dimensions for gender, education, experience and age. The 
results indicate that significant differences for age were found for password generation (t=1.61, p<0.1) and 
proactive awareness (t=2.32, p<.05). Gender differences were also found for password generation (t=1.90, 
p<0.05) and updating (t=3.11, p<0.01) dimensions.  Only difference for education was found for proactive 
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awareness (t=1.38, p<0.1). Experience made a difference for proactive awareness (t=1.74, p<0.05) and 
updating (t=2.45, p<0.01). These results provide partial support for H2.  
DISCUSSION 
Before discussing the contributions, we point out the limitations of this study. We have used behavior 
intentions rather than actual behaviors. Although there is evidence that intentions reflect actual behavior 
(Egelman et al., 2016), future studies can incorporate actual behaviors. Further, although we have taken 
precautions like providing confidentiality and anonymity to respondents, we still acknowledge the 
limitation of self-reports. In addition, since the respondents came from a University, it is likely that the 
respondents have different educational background than general population. As with other research studies, 
we had to deal with dropped responses from our sample. Therefore, further testing with different 
populations will help generalize the SeBIS scale.   
Previous SeBIS research that tested the relationship between risk (measured using DOSPERT scale) and 
SeBIS dimensions found mixed results. For example, Gratian et al. (2018) found significant relationship 
between financial risk-taking and password generation, whereas Egelman and Peer (2015) did not. We 
suggested the use of a risk scale that is appropriate for security domain. Our results from H1 provide 
consistent support for risk-security behavior relationship across all SeBIS domains (device securement, 
password generation, proactive awareness and updating). Our study is the first to find support for risk – 
‘device securement’ relationship compared to previous SeBIS studies.   
Based on these results, we propose the use of security-context risk as appropriate in SeBIS studies. Future 
research could also test the proposed changes to SeBIS dimensions. Specifically, we suggest that the item 
‘I use a PIN or passcode to unlock my mobile phone (Device Securement)’ needs modification due to the 
advances in biometric authentication methods available on mobile phones. Further, we suggest that “When 
browsing websites, I mouse over links to see where they go, before clicking them (Proactive awareness)” 
be modified. This present study and previous research has found that this item cross-loads on different 
dimensions of SeBIS. 
No differences in device securement were found for age, gender, education and experience. In addition to 
Gratian et al. (2018)’s lack of support for this SeBIS dimension indicates further examination is needed. 
Results suggest that females generated weaker password generation behaviors than males. In addition, 
youngest group in our sample had weaker password generation behaviors. This pattern of results is similar 
to Sheng et al. (2010)’s study where young, female respondents are susceptible to phishing.  
Significant differences for awareness dimension were found for age, education and experience. 
Respondents, who are older, have higher education and experience have better security awareness. These 
results provide indirect support for inclusion of training programs as a way to raise awareness. Further, for 
updating dimension, differences were found for experience and gender. Females are risk averse (Harris et 
al., 2006), and it is likely that females see updating as a change and therefore unwilling to take that chance.  
Experienced individuals might know the potential problems of outdated software and are more willing to 
update. Our study is the first to find support for influence of education and experience in SeBIS studies.  
CONCLUSION 
Understanding behavioral security is important and therefore, the need for a tool such as SeBIS that can 
measure broad range of security behaviors. In this study, we further test the SeBIS scale and provide some 
suggestions on improving the scale. Further, we establish a consistent risk-security behavior relationship 
by using a security domain appropriate risk scale. Finally, our study establishes individual differences that 
were previously undiscovered. We believe that this study adds to literature by extending the work on SeBIS 








 1 2 3 4 5 
SeBIS1ssUPD .821 -.018 -.007 .081 .168 
SeBIS2ssUPD .791 .240 .183 .101 .082 
SeBIS3ssSEC .171 .182 .109 .659 .001 
SeBIS4ssSEC .088 .088 .022 .822 .038 
SeBIS5ssSEC .238 .071 .043 .320 .739 
SeBIS6ssSEC -.045 -.115 .104 .728 .189 
SeBIS7ssPA .225 .623 .119 .111 .274 
SeBIS8ssPA -.134 .534 .374 .263 -.247 
SeBIS9ssUPD .673 .184 .326 .043 -.117 
SeBIS10ssPA .374 .387 .084 .322 -.404 
SeBIS11ssPA .061 .781 .020 -.058 .129 
SeBIS12ssPG .231 .360 .545 -.030 -.041 
SeBIS13ssPG .113 .121 .701 .074 -.110 
SeBIS14ssPG -.136 .229 .638 .087 .439 
SeBIS15ssPG .266 -.050 .746 .157 .110 
SeBIS16ssPA .143 .569 .155 .060 -.165 
Table A1: Five Factor solution for SeBIS 
  Updating Pwd Gen Pro. Aware Dev Secu 
SeBIS1ssUPD .841 -.013 -.032 .115 
SeBIS2ssUPD .817 .149 .258 .122 
SeBIS9ssUPD .670 .297 .198 .013 
SeBIS3ssSEC .176 .119 .185 .649 
SeBIS4ssSEC .106 .016 .112 .835 
SeBIS6ssSEC -.031 .116 -.101 .749 
SeBIS7ssPA .251 .157 .572 .149 
SeBIS8ssPA -.127 .314 .600 .228 
SeBIS11ssPA .067 .060 .722 -.051 
SeBIS12ssPG .240 .531 .372 -.053 
SeBIS13ssPG .123 .664 .171 .042 
SeBIS14ssPG -.089 .703 .162 .158 
SeBIS15ssPG .268 .758 -.048 .132 
SeBIS16ssPA .144 .065 .672 .016 
Table A2: Four factor solution for SeBIS 
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